Fr. Robert John Araujo, a law professor at Loyola Chicago whom I've had some interesting discussions with, tried to answer this question in a post at Mirror of Justice. Unfortunately, he got it basically wrong.
Araujo starts by quoting the words of Pope John XXIII:
This argument resonates with me for various reasons. But Araujo seems to misunderstand it, apparently using it as support for his claim that, definitionally speaking, each "human being" (however defined) is a "person." This is the concept, Araujo argues, of the "natural person."
Araujo goes on to mischaracterize two Supreme Court cases: Dred Scott v. Sanford and Roe v. Wade.
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court did not say that fetuses were not persons. Instead, they found that the mother has a privacy right that, in certain circumstances, states cannot invade by criminalizing decisions she makes about her own body.
Finally, Araujo goes on to argue that recognizing the personhood of the fetus will necessitate acceptance of his preferred anti-choice ban on abortions. As I've argued before, that's simply not true.
Araujo starts by quoting the words of Pope John XXIII:
Any human society, if it is to be well-ordered and productive must lay down as a foundation this principle, namely, that every human being is a person, that is, his nature is endowed with intelligence and free will. Indeed, precisely because he is a person he has rights and obligations flowing directly and simultaneously from his rights and obligations flowing directly and simultaneously from his very nature. And as these rights and obligations are universal and inviolable so they cannot in any way be surrendered.This is affirmation of the personhood of all human beings is based on the most sensible argument: pragmatism. We must accept that each human is a person, the pope argues, because if we don't do so we won't have a "well-ordered and productive" society.
This argument resonates with me for various reasons. But Araujo seems to misunderstand it, apparently using it as support for his claim that, definitionally speaking, each "human being" (however defined) is a "person." This is the concept, Araujo argues, of the "natural person."
Araujo goes on to mischaracterize two Supreme Court cases: Dred Scott v. Sanford and Roe v. Wade.
Lawyers and the rest of society, surely since the 1973 decision in Roe, have been arguing over this and related issues for some time. It would also seem that the connection between rights or claims and obligations or responsibilities identified by Blessed John confound many, including some members of the academy. Of course the debates and disagreements that emerge from the juxtaposition of these two subjects, i.e., rights and obligations, were brought to a head in Dred Scott. There was no question that in reality Dred Scott was a person; however, the law, as formulated by five of the seven members of the Supreme Court (who, by the way were also persons) said otherwise. We sort of get that same conclusion, albeit in different wording, in Roe v. Wade from the majority opinion. What rights can a human being/human person claim, and what obligations are owed to this claimant? That is the question.In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court did not say that the plaintiff was not a person, it found that — as the descendent of African slaves — he was not a citizen of the United States, and thus not a citizen of any of the several states.
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court did not say that fetuses were not persons. Instead, they found that the mother has a privacy right that, in certain circumstances, states cannot invade by criminalizing decisions she makes about her own body.
Finally, Araujo goes on to argue that recognizing the personhood of the fetus will necessitate acceptance of his preferred anti-choice ban on abortions. As I've argued before, that's simply not true.
I have to take issue with this: "But Araujo seems to misunderstand it, apparently using it as support for his claim that, definitionally speaking, each "human being" (however defined) is a "person.""
ReplyDeleteAndrew, I think that's exactly what John XXIII is saying with
"Any human society, if it is to be well-ordered and productive must lay down as a foundation this principle, namely, that every human being is a person,"
I think it's pretty clear His Holiness was saying every human being is, or at least must be considered, a person, since that's literally what he said. I don't think there's a meaningful distinction between something being true and being stipulated as true for Araujo's purposes.
There's a significant difference between arguing that a certain principle must be accepted in order to reach a certain result (Pope John) and arguing that it is true in itself (Fr. Araujo).
ReplyDeleteCall me a pragmatist, but I'm not seeing the importance of that distinction for this discussion. If we call john a citizen, give him the protections afforded to citizens, and give him all the abilities of a citizen, what makes him not a citizen? John says that it is necessary we hold that all human beings are people. Araujo says that all human beings are people. It's true that the way you argue the points may be different, but I didn't get the impression you disagreed with John. What does it matter if you think we have to stipulate every individual as a person and Araujo thinks every individual is a person, in practice?
ReplyDeleteWell, first there's an intrinsic value to having an accurate foundation for and understanding of philosophical claims. But more than that, Araujo's formulation allows him to be loose with the meaning of personhood. John's pragmatic justification for it places implicit limitations on the term, whereas Araujo's looseness allows him to manipulate the term to fit his own ends.
ReplyDelete